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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
UINTAH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant and 
% Appellant. 
Case No. 14469 
1&& 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
IN ANSWER TO 
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for breach of contract arising out 
of Appellant's failure to renew Respondent's contract of employ-
ment with it. Respondent seeks reinstatement as a teacher with 
Appellant and damages for breach of contract including all rights 
and benefits which he would have received had he not been impro-
perly terminated by Appellant. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This action was tried to a jury on December 10, 1975, 
at Vernal, Utah, before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge. 
By stipulation of the parties, the question presented to the jury 
was whether or not Respondent resigned his position of employment 
with Appellant. By Special Verdict, the jury found that Respon-
dent had not resigned his position of employment. The Court en-
tered judgment against Appellant on January 28, 1976 awarding 
Respondent $18,070.03 in damages and further ordered Appellant 
to reinstate Respondent as a teacher together with all rights 
and benefits he would have received had he not been terminated 
contrary to the terms of his contract of employment with Appellant. 
The Appellant timely appealed the decision of the dis-
trict court on February 11, 1976. The issues were briefed and 
this Court heard argument on October 12, 1976. 
In an opinion filed May 4, 1977, this Court affirmed 
the judgment of the district court in favor of the Respondent. 
Appellant petitioned for re-hearing May 24, 1977 and that petition 
was granted. 
-2-
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ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case are more fully set forth in 
the Brief's previously filed with the Court. Appellant has 
cited a portion of the trial transcript in sipport of its 
contention that Respondent's stipulation (1) entitled Appell-
ant to have the case dismissed as a matter of law; and (2) 
caused it not to assert the defense that it terminated (fired) 
Respondent before May 11, 1973, the date the Utah Orderly 
School Termination Procedures Act became effective. 
To Appellant's citation of the record must be add-
ed the following: 
The Court:
 ; 4 
Now Mr. Lybbert, you had a matter that 
you asked Mr. Dibblee to stipulate re-
garding, and Mr. Dibblee indicated that ^ , 
he didn't see any reason why not—go 
ahead. 
Mr. Lybbert: 
I understand that the plaintiff is 
no;- willing to stipulate that they have 
not preceeded or intended to proceed 
4 ; :
 under the Utah Governmental Immunity ' 
Act and have not attempted nor have 
they complied with the notice provi- J' 
sions of that act. 
Mr. Dibblee: 
I understand that's correct. 
Mr. Lybbert: 
No. 2: I understand from our previous 
conversation that you are not making 
any claim under the provisions of the 
Utah Orderly School Termination Pro-
cedures Act, Section 53-51-1, et seq. 
Mr. Dibblee: 
That's correct. 
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The Court: 
So whether or not the plaintiff is en-
titled to recover, again, is dependant 
upon the Jury's verdict as to whether 
or not there was a dismissal or a re-
signation, 
Mr. Dibblee: 
That's correct, sir. Tr. p.2. 
Counsel for the Appellant does not object to the Court's 
analysis of the issues at that time, or at any other time dur-
ing the trial. Again, at page four of the transcript the 
Court states: 
The Court: 
Well, there is a question of fact 
though, isn't there; whether he was 
dismissed or whether he resigned? 
Isn't that a question of fact under 
the evidence that you intend to 
present, both of you? 
Mr. Lybbert: 
(Nodded his head.) 
Mr. Dibblee: 
Well, the defendant of course claims 
there was a resignation. 
In his opening statement to the jury, counsel for Appell-
ant stated: 
As I see it, the central issue is whe-
ther or not Mr. Pratt advised Mr. Evans 
in the spring of '73 that he didn't 
wish to have his contract renewed with 
the District. That's the case. Tr. p.22. 
Appellant however, argues that because of Mr. Dibblee's 
statements regarding the Utah Orderly School Termination Pro-
cedures Act, it did not present evidence regarding "a signi-
ficant factual issue...over the actual date upon which Respondent 
was terminated." Respondent then suggests that therp t^o a AA«_ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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agreement as to whether plaintiff was notified April 27, or May 
11, 1977 that his contract of employment would not be renewed. 
In so framing the issue, Appellant is misleading. The 
issue throughout the trial and the one on which Appellant based its 
defense was that Respondent resigned. The sole issue submitted 
to the jury was whether or not Respondent resigned. The jury found 
that Respondent did not resign. It makes little difference which 
date Respondent did not resign as he continued his employment until 
the end of the school year, several weeks after the Utah Orderly 
School Termination Procedures Act became effective. 
Apparently Appellant now asks this Court to permit it 
to retry the case on a theory inconsistent with its representations 
to the trial court and to the jury. 
Moreover, even after Mr. Dibblee?s stipulations to the 
Court, the trial court considered the question of dismissal to be 
a possible issue in the case. Tr. pp.2 and 4. Counsel for Appell-
ant did not object to the trial courts characterization of the issue 
until this appeal. 
Presumably, Appellant now seeks to retry this case on 
the basis that it unlawfully breached Respondent's contract of em-
ployment prior to May 11, 1973 when the Utah Orderly School Teach-
er's Termination Procedures Act became effective and then assert 
Respondent's failure to file notice as provided in section 6 §-30-13 
of the Governmental Immunity Act as a defense. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. THE UTAH ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION 
PROCEDURES ACTl/ PROVIDES A METHOD OF 
"NOTICE" OF A CLAIM AGAINST THE APPELLANT 
THAT FULLY MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT,2/ AND IS A SUB-
STITUTE THEREFORE. 
In its Brief on appeal Respondent urged this Court to 
find that the procedural administrative remedies set forth in the 
Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act are in lieu of or 
a substitute for the notice requirements of section 63-3 0-13 of 
the Governmental Immunity Act. This Court held that Plaintiff's 
failure to file a notice of claim, within ninety days after May 
11, 1973, did not bar his claim. Respondent's arguments in sup-
port of his position appear at pages 10 through 18 of his initial 
Brief and need not be repeated. This court further held that 
Respondent's claim did not mature until September 25, 1973 after 
the Board of Education held the hearing requested by Respondent 
and on that date issued its written determination. This Court was 
correct in ruling that Respondent's claim did not mature until 
September 25, 1973 for two reasons. First, section 53-6-20, Utah 
Code Annotated (Supp. 1975) vests in the board of education of 
each school district the power to operate, control and maintain 
the school system and to "adopt bylaws and rules for its own pro-
cedure and make and enforce rules and regulations for the control 
and management of the public schools of the district." As the 
Board is vested with the power to control the school district and 
it granted the Respondent an opportunity to appear before it be-
fore a final decision was made to terminate him, his cause of 
1/ Sections 53-50-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated (Supp.1975). 
2/ Section 63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated (1953). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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action did not arise until the board took action—September 2 5, 
1973. The second reason the Utah Orderly School Termination 
Procedures Act applies is below set forth. 
B. THE UTAH ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMIN-
ATION PROCEDURES ACT IS A REMEDIAL 
AND PROCEDURAL ACT AND THEREFORE 
OPERATES RETROSPECTIVELY. 
Appellant now represents to this Court that for Mr. Dibblee's 
"stipulation," it would have argued to the trial court that Mr. 
Evans terminated Respondent before the effective date of the Utah 
Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, presumably April 27, 
1973 instead of May 11, 1973 . Whichever date the "event" took 
place, the procedural administrative remedies of the Utah Orderly 
School Teachers Termination Procedure Act apply for the reason 
that procedural and remedial acts operate retrospectively as well 
as prospectively. ..
 i : ^ , 
. . . remedial or procedural statutes 
which do not create, enlarge, diminish, 
or destroy contractual or vested rights 
but relate only to remedies or modes of 
procedure are not within the general 
rule against retrospective operation 
but are generally held to operate retro-
spectively. Such statutes will not be 
given retrospective operation if to do 
so would impair contractual obligation 
or serve vested rights, unless the lang-
uage of the statute indicates that such 
is the legislative intent. 
While it has been held that a remedial 
statute will not be given retrospective 
or retroactive operation unless the leg-
islative intent appears on the face of 
the statute, expressly, by plain and 
positive language, or by necessary impli-
cation, the rule that, unless the langu-
age of the statute so requires, the sta-
tute should not be given retrospective 
or retroactive operation has been held 
not to apply to purely remedial laws, 
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unless an intent to the contrary is 
shown; and a remedial statute is to 
be construed to give effect the pur-
pose for which it was enacted, and, 
if the reason of the statute extends 
to the past transactions as well as 
those in the future, it will be so 
applied, although it does not, in 
terms, so direct, unless to do so 
would impair some vested right or 
violate some constitutional quarantee. 
82 CJS, Statutes, §416; See also 82 
CJS, Statutes, §421. 
A statute is remedial and has retroactive application 
when it relates to practice, procedure or remedies and does 
not affect a substantive or vested right. Johnson v. Bene-
ficial Management Corporation of America, 538 p.2d 510 (Wash. 
1975); Tellier v. Edwards. 354 P.2d 925 (Wash. 1960). 
In the construction of remedial statutes, regard must 
always be had for the evident purpose for which the statute 
was enacted, and if the reason of the statute extends to past 
events as well as those in the future, it will be so applied, 
even though the statute does not specifically so direct, unless, 
of course, to construe a statute retrospectively would impair 
some vested right or impinge on a constitutional guaranty. 
Abrams v. Stone, 154 c.A.2d 33, 315 P.2d 453 (1957). 
Respondent submits that the Utah Orderly School Termination 
Procedures Act was enacted as remedial legislation to afford edu-
cators procedural due process against harsh, arbitrary or unlaw-
ful conduct by a capricious supervisor or superintendent. No 
doubt it was also a response to Perry v. Sindermann, 4 08 U.S. 
593 (1972) and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) 
wherein the Court held that an individual employed by a unit of 
-8-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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government that had a reasonable expectation of continued em-
ployment or a contractual right to employment, cannot be de-
prived of that right without being afforded procedural due 
process as required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States. 
A written contract with an explicit 
tenure provision clearly is evidence 
of a formal understanding that supports 
a teacher's claim of entitlement to 
continued employment unless sufficient 
"cause" is shown... Perry v. Sindermanny 
at 408 U.S. 601.
 v , ^ r, ,^ _ ,. 
The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural
 A . - r 
protection is a safeguard of the secur-
ity of interests that a person has al-
ready acquired in specific benefits. 
Board of Regents v. Roth at 408 U.S. 575. 
It is the purpose of the ancient insti-
tution of property to protect those 
claims upon which people rely in their 
daily lives, reliance that must not be 
arbitrarily undermined. It is the pur-
pose of the constitutional right to a 
hearing to provide an opportunity for 
a person to vindicate those claims. 
K ,, ; • Id. at 577. 
Initially, Mr. Evans maintained that Respondent's con-
tract and "tenure" were with the school that was closed.. 
Later, he took the position that Respondent resigned. Now, 
Appellant wants to argue that Respondent was terminated. The 
jury found that Respondent did not resign. Respondent's con-
tract of employment clearly gave him a contract right to con-
tinued employment. If he were terminated, it is submitted 
that under the doctrines developed in Perry and Roth, Respon-
dent had a constitutional right to procedural due process and 
therefore, a fair hearing. The Utah Orderly School Teacher 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Termination Procedures Act merely prescribes the procedure 
for procedural due process. As such, the statute has retro-
spective application. 
C. STIPULATIONS BY COUNSEL PRIOR TO 
TRIAL IN NO WAY EFFECT THIS CASE. 
For the reasons above stated, the stipulation made by 
counsel for Respondent prior to trial in no way effect the 
basis upon which the Court has decided this case. It must 
here be noted that Appellant's representation to this Court 
that, "There has never been so much as a suggestion either 
in the trial transcript, at post-trial hearings, in the Re-
spondent's brief on appeal or in the arguments before this 
Court, that the stipulation did not accurately set forth 
the agreement of the parties", is misleading. Both at post-
trial hearings and at page 11 of Respondent's brief, Respon-
dent has maintained that Mr. Dibblee's stipulation went only 
to the claim of procedural due process. That is what the act 
requires. The board granted the hearing and made its decision. 
No claim was thereafter asserted that the district had failed 
to comply with it's requirements. Respondent submits that 
the purpose of the notice requirement in the Governmental Im-
munity Act is to give a public body notice of a claim before 
it results in litigation. (See pages 16 and 17 of Respondent's 
initial Brief.) The request for hearing and hearing provision's 
of the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act fully sa-
tisfies the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity 
Act. (See pages 10 through 18 of Respondent's initial Brief.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully requests this Court re-affirm it's 
earlier decision entered in this matter. In the event this Court 
grants Appellant's request for a new trial, Respondent requests 
that the new trial be limited to only those issues of fact not 
already decided by the jury in this case,
 r , ,.!f?r; 
Respectfully submitted this &C ^ J day of \Jt )fiP~' 1977. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief 
were mailed, postage prepaid, to counsel for Appellant, Merlin
 r 
R. Lybbert, 700 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101, this
 t^L y day of June, 1977. 
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